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1 Introduction
In developing countries, intermediation costs and enforcement frictions constrain access to external
finance by entrepreneurs - leaving their earning retention as a key element for small business growth.
But, what explains entrepreneurial decisions to reinvest their profits into their own businesses? Given
the limited access to formal financial services, many entrepreneurs use informal mechanisms of saving
and liquidity management to facilitate their earnings retention, part of a larger phenomenon of infor-
mal financing arrangements dominating corporate finance in many developing countries (Allen et al.
2005, 2012). In this paper, we utilize a novel entrepreneurial survey to explore whether entrepreneurial
saving practices can explain variation in entrepreneurs’ reinvestment decisions. Specifically, we gauge
whether the decision to save with formal financial institutions, individually (under the mattress),
within the household or via other informal arrangements, such as rotating savings and credit associa-
tions (ROSCAs), affect the decision to reinvest entrepreneurial earnings. We motivate our empirical
work with a simple theoretical model that shows that an entrepreneur’s reinvestment decision de-
pends on the entrepreneur’s saving practice, in addition to productivity and borrowing capacity of her
entrepreneurial firm.
In the absence of easy access to external finance, saving for business purposes should be posi-
tively correlated with profit reinvestment decisions. However, the saving mechanism itself might be a
critical element in determining the ability to reinvest. On the one hand, for formal savers the oppor-
tunity cost of consuming savings instead of reinvesting them is not only the loss of financial reserves
but also the foregone interest income. On the other hand, the “within-household savers” might be
less likely to reinvest, because they suffer from the redistributive pressure resulting from the saved
funds being held inside the household. If the remaining household members are aware of the existence
of entrepreneurial savings, it can be hard to prevent the funds from being exploited for the general
consumption needs of the household. In addition to these two extreme cases, we can also think of
the “individual savers” and the “informal finance network savers”as alternative saving practice types.
Comparing “individual savers” with “informal network savers”, we note that although the interest
income from informal finance networks should have a positive impact on the opportunity cost of con-
sumption and foster investment, the inflexibility to withdraw savings at informal financial institutions
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might offset this income effect and reduce the earnings retention.1
In order to inform our empirical hypotheses we first present a simple theoretical model to
explain the relationship between entrepreneurial investment decisions and saving practices. We show
that entrepreneurs are more likely to invest in their businesses if they save in a fashion which allows
them easy access to their funds, such as formal savings accounts or personal saving mechanisms.
To test the empirical relationship between savings patterns and entrepreneurial reinvestment
decisions, we use a micro- and small enterprise (MSE) survey for over 6,000 entrepreneurs undertaken in
2010 in Tanzania. The sample of entrepreneurs surveyed covers a large variety of enterprises in different
locations, of different gender, educational profile and sectors. We document that entrepreneurs’ saving
practices do indeed co-vary with the likelihood of earnings retention at MSEs. The survey design allows
us to differentiate between different savings vehicles, including within household saving, saving under
the pillow, informal savings clubs, and formal deposit accounts. Our results reveal that the probability
of reinvestment is significantly higher for savers and that when compared against formal deposit account
holders, entrepreneurs with informal saving practices are significantly less likely to reinvest. However,
the type of informal saving instrument matters in generating an adverse consequence for reinvestment.
Specifically, we find that when we compare the practice of keeping savings within the household against
the practice of having a deposit account at a formal financial institution, the latter is more likely to
be associated with reinvestment than the former. Other informal savers and formal deposit savers do
not exhibit significantly different reinvestment rates.
We conduct a series of checks to ensure the robustness of our results to the inclusion of addi-
tional control variables, alternative model specifications, and endogeneity biases. First, stable coeffi-
cient estimates across an array of specifications shows that it is unlikely that our results are driven by
omitted variable bias (Altonji et al. (2005)). Second, to address the potential reverse causation of high
reinvestment on saving practices we utilize the distance to the nearest bank and entrepreneur’s age as
1The rate of return to savings in social saving clubs is typically lower compared to formal financial institutions. For
related discussion see Vonderlack and Schreiner (2002). Entrepreneurs saving via informal channels are more likely to
have limited access to their savings. For instance, members of ROSCAs cannot access their savings until their turn
comes (see Besley et al. (1993) for a theoretical discussion of ROSCAs), unless there is a relevant secondary market
(Calomiris and Rajamaran, 1998). Similarly, moneylenders may postpone repaying the savings or it might be hard to
reach them.
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instruments in recursive bivariate probit regressions. We use these two instruments, because accessibil-
ity to a bank and entrepreneur’s age can explain whether the savings will be kept in a bank account or
shared with the rest of the household, but - as we show - these two variables are not directly associated
with reinvestment decisions. The coefficient estimates in the instrumental variable regressions remain
stable and significant across all specifications. Finally, we explore the differential effects of saving
patterns on reinvestment decision across groups with different intra-household bargaining power. We
find that the negative relationship between saving within the household and reinvestment is stronger
for entrepreneurs with lower intra-household bargaining power, such as females and non-household
heads.
While research on finance and investment has almost exclusively concentrated on the impact of
external finance constraints on investment behavior, our paper adds to a very recent liteature arguing
that relaxing the internal finance constraints is vital for investment and enterprise growth in developing
countries as much as allowing for access to external finance. In this respect, Banerjee and Duflo (2011)
suggest that saving constraints in the developing world could imply poverty traps for low income
households. Karlan, Ratan and Zinman (2013) state in their survey article that undersaving can have
important welfare consequences, such as variable consumption, low resilience to shocks, and foregone
profitable investments.
Our paper has multiple novel contributions for this new financial development research agenda,
which focuses on inefficiency of savings and real economic performance. First, our paper is the first in
identifying that a variety of different informal saving practices are being applied among entrepreneurs.
Second, we concentrate on re-investment of entrepreneurial earnings as an outcome variable, as in-
centives that induce earnings retention or reinvestment are expected to be particularly important in
alleviating financial constraints. A large fraction of the existing literature on finance and investment
has overlooked this particular type of investment behavior in empirical studies. Third, by exploit-
ing the variation in these two key variables, we show that a large spectrum of the informal saving
mechanisms do not decrease the likelihood of entrepreneurial re-investment relative to saving formally.
Rather, we show a significant negative impact of one particular informal saving method, namely, sav-
ing within the household on re-investment likelihood, and highlight this inefficient saving practice as a
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channel through which formal financial development policies could induce entrepreneurial investment
in developing countries.
Tanzania is a perfect setting to test the relationship between different saving practices and
entrepreneurial investment decisions. Tanzania is a low-income country in East Africa, whose private
sector is dominated by micro- and small enterprises. While the financial sector was liberalized in the
1990s and there is a large number of formal financial institutions, access to formal financial services is
very low, with only 17% of adults having a formal bank account (World Bank (2012)). Tanzania shares
many characteristics with other low-income countries in Africa, including a very disperse population
and a high degree of informality.
This paper relates to several distinct literatures. First of all, our study relates to past research on
finance and entrepreneurial investment, which has shown that entrepreneurs invest more if they expect
high private returns from their investment activity (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998)).
Moreover, there are several studies investigating the impact of access to external finance on investment
for microenterprises (Karlan and Zinman (2010a); Karlan and Zinman (2010b); Kaboski and Townsend
(2011); Ayyagari et al. (2012); Attanasio et al. (2012) and Banerjee et al. (2013)). Particularly
important for our paper is the literature that aims to understand the determinants of re-investment
among entrepreneurial firms in developing countries and emerging markets. Johnson et al. (2002)
examine the relative importance of property rights and external finance in Eastern European countries
and find property rights to be relatively more important in explaining the earnings reinvestment among
entrepreneurial firms. On the other hand, Cull and Xu (2005) show that access to external finance in
the form of bank loans is associated with more reinvestment for Chinese entrepreneurs. We add to this
literature by focusing on savings patterns as additional factor to explain the variation in reinvestment
decisions across micro- and small entrepreneurs.
Second, our paper relates to a growing literature on the relative importance of formal and
informal financing mechanisms in developing countries. Allen et al. (2005, 2012) posit that alternative
financing channels, such as internal financing and trade credit as well as informal coalitions of firms,
investors, and local governments are more important than formal bank credit in fostering the growth of
Chinese and Indian enterprises, while Ayyagari et al. (2010) show that it is bank-finance rather than
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informal financing that fosters firm growth in China. Similarly, Fisman and Love (2003) show that
industries with higher dependence on trade credit financing exhibit higher growth rates in countries
with weak financial institutions. Cull et al. (2009) use a large panel dataset of Chinese industrial
firms and find that poorly performing state-owned-enterprises are more likely to redistribute credit
to firms with limited access to bank loans. We add to this literature by focusing on the savings
side of the debate. We disaggregate informal saving practices and show that some informal saving
mechanisms function reasonably well - whereas others do not - in inducing entrepreneurs to reinvest.
By this we contribute to understanding where and when the benefits might not exceed the large fixed
costs associated with increasing the outreach of formal financial products (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and
Martinez Peria (2007)).
Third, we contribute to the growing literature concerning the implications of access to different
saving instruments in developing countries. There is an increasing number of studies exploring the
impact of access to formal banking services on the level of savings (Burgess and Panda (2005); Kaboski
and Townsend (2005); Dupas and Robinson (2013a)). A recent experimental study by Dupas and
Robinson (2013a) shows that entrepreneurs with formal bank accounts save and invest more in their
businesses than entrepreneurs who do not save in formal banks. In a companion study (Dupas and
Robinson (2013b)), the authors compare the health investment performance of women saving via
various informal saving instruments and find that some of them boost investment in health. Similarly
Brune et al. (2013) evaluate the effect of commitment to keep savings accounts on several outcomes for
Malawian cash crop farmers. We contribute to this literature by comparing the investment likelihood
of formal savers with different types of informal savers such as individual savers, savers via other
household members, informal savings club members and moneylenders.
Finally, our paper relates to the literature on barriers to saving in developing countries (see Kar-
lan, Ratan and Zinman (2013), for an overview). In addition to geographic, monetary and regulatory
barriers, there are significant social constraints on saving behavior, partly related to the position of
the entrepreneur within the household. Previous research has linked participation in informal savings
clubs, such as ROSCAs, to intra-household bargaining problems (e.g., Besley et al. (1993), Ander-
son and Baland (2002)). Social constraints can also explain why entrepreneurs save and borrow at
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the same time. Critically, the literature has shown that the relative position within the household is
important for saving and investment decisions. For instance, de Mel et al. (2008) show that as the
decision making power of women in the household increases, returns to capital and investment for
women increase as well. Ashraf (2009) in a lab experiment in Philippines documents that subjects are
more likely to save the randomly allocated money in their private deposit accounts if their spouse is
not aware of the money, while they prefer to consume if the spouse knows about it. Evidence from an
experimental study with 142 married couples in Kenya showed that husbands increase private spend-
ing if they receive an income shock. But if their wives receive the shock they do not increase their
consumption (Robinson (2011)). Likewise Schaner (2013) finds that well matched Kenyan couples are
more likely to use joint accounts instead of costly individual ones. Our study supports these findings
by showing that members of the household who have potentially less power in decision making are less
likely to turn their household savings into investments.
Unlike many other papers in this literature that discuss randomized control trials (RCTs), our
paper relies on cross-sectional survey data and thus faces the usual endogeneity biases. We address
these concerns by using instrumental variables and by exploring the differential relationship between
savings patterns and reinvestment decision across different entrepreneurial groups. Beyond these
methodological differences; however, our analysis also allows a broader exploration of reinvestment
decisions across different savings patterns. In addition, we realize that such savings patterns are the
outcome of repeated interactions and persistent habits and are thus harder if not impossible to control
under a randomized control trial.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical model to show how
saving practices can influence entrepreneurial investment decisions. Section 3 discusses the regression
set-up and the set of control variables. Section 4 presents the data we use for our analysis. Section
5 discusses our main findings, while section 6 discusses the determinants of saving choice, tests for
reverse causality, provides an extensive list of robustness checks and studies sub-sample heterogeneity
concerning our key estimation results. Section 7 concludes.
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2 A 2-Period Model
We develop a partial equilibrium heterogeneous firms model to study the interactions between en-
trepreneurial business saving practices and profit reinvestment. In our model entrepreneurial hetero-
geneity has three dimensions: productivity, borrowing capacity, and saving practice. In the benchmark
model all of the three dimensions are exogenous. We also extend the benchmark in section 2.4, where
we endogenize the saving practice as an entrepreneurial decision.
Parallel to the reinvestment and saving practice variables that we use in the empirical specifi-
cation in section 3 below, we model reinvestment as a direct re-injection of some of the business profits
back into the business. In the following, we first present the economic environment, and then the
entrepreneur’s maximization problem, before deriving the optimal investment behavior. This allows
us to obtain several empirically testable hypotheses.
2.1 Environment
There are two time periods, 1 and 2 ; a continuum of entrepreneurs indexed by i; and a good - call
it cash - that can be invested, saved or consumed. Entrepreneurs have linear preferences over the
life-time consumption such that
Ui = c1,i + βc2,i, (1)
where U is the life-time utility and c1 and c2 are consumption levels in period-1 and in period-2
respectively. The parameter β is a discount factor. This linear preference specification is not essential
for the qualitative findings of the model. It allows us to solve for the investment likelihood of the
entrepreneur as we will present in equations (11) and (12) below.
In the beginning of period-1, each entrepreneur is endowed with ω units of investable funds
which we assume to be homogeneously distributed among all entrepreneurs in the economy. We
interpret this endowment as the net earnings generated by the entrepreneur a priori to period-1. In
period-1, entrepreneurs can utilize the ω-endowment to re-invest as productive capital (k1,i), save
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as liquid reserves for business purposes (s1,i), or consume (c1,i) -yielding the budget constraint for
period-1:
k1,i + c1,i + s1,i ≤ ω.
The uses of productive capital and saving for business purposes are as follows. Each entrepreneur has
access to a production technology that converts the investable funds of period-1 into the output of
period-2. The output realization of the entrepreneurial technology is conditional on a liquidity injection
that needs to be incurred at the beginning of period-2. Specifically, entrepreneur i’s technology yields
Aik1,i units of cash in period-2 in return of k1,i units of capital investment in period-1 plus an additional
L(k1,i) if and only if the entrepreneur is capable of injecting an L(k1,i) at the beginning of the period-
2 that is greater than `2k1,i. The parameter Ai > 1 captures the productivity heterogeneity across
entrepreneurs. A high Ai can be associated with better training, education or some sort of intrinsic
ability to manage a firm. We assume that A is drawn independently and identically from a distribution
at the beginning of the period-1. In this economy, firms must have the capacity to manage liquid
reserves in order to be able to undertake productive investment opportunities.2 The liquidity need
of the firm, `2k1,i poses an inefficient use of capital: Every unit capital saved for liquidity purposes
does not get to invested into the productive investment opportunity. The liquidity holdings L can be
financed via two sources:
1. The entrepreneur can save cash from period-1 to period-2, which we will call saving for business
purposes denoted by s1,i, at a rate ζi with ζi ≤ 1. In this formulation, ζi captures saving practice
(in)efficiency of the entrepreneur. We assume that there are two general saving practice types:
Formal (ζF ) and informal (ζI) - to be endogenized in section 2.5. We suppose that ζF = 1
for those who save formally, whereas ζI is drawn from a distribution function with ζI < 1.
The heterogeneity in informal saving (in)efficiency can be motivated, for instance, by the cross-
sectional variation in within-household bargaining power, as we will discuss below.
2. The entrepreneur can borrow, denote it with b2,i, up to a θi fraction of `2k1,i in the financial
market at a gross interest rate 1, where θi is an entrepreneur specific parameter capturing the
2We assume that `2 is a common parameter among all firms in the economy. The qualitative features of the model
would remain identical if we assumed heterogeneity and stochasticity in liquidity demand.
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ability to raise working capital finance externally. Formally, entrepreneur’s borrowing constraint
has the following form:
θi`2k1,i ≥ b2,i.
The borrowing capacity θ is drawn from a distribution function at the beginning of the period-1.
We can state the entrepreneurial total output at the end of the period-2 as follows:
y2,i = Aik1,i + L(k1,i) if L(k1,i) ≥ `2k1,i,
= L(k1,i) if L(k1,i) < `2k1,i. (2)
At (2), we make it clear that if and only if the expected liquidity needs in period-2 can be financed,
the output available to entrepreneur i will yield the cash-flow generated by the technology, Aik1,i, in
addition to the firm’s liquidity holdings.3 Hence, in this economy, firms must have the capacity to
manage liquid reserves in order to be able to undertake productive investment opportunities , and
savings for business purposes have an indirect impact on reinvestment through liquidity needs.
Entrepreneurs consume and repay using the period-2 output - yielding the period-2 budget
constraint
c2,i + b2,i ≤ y2,i.
The timing of events in both periods is specified as the following:
I. Period-1
1. Entrepreneurial (3-dimensional) types are realized.
2. Capital investment into the production technology.
3. Saving for business purposes.
3This type of a production function specification has been previously utilized in finance and development literature
by Aghion et al. (2010): In their dynamic general equilibrium model, the authors introduce a complementarity between
the ability to cope with future liquidity needs and current long-term investment and explain the negative correlation




1. Borrowing to finance liquidity needs.
2. Liquidity injection: Using borrowed funds and savings from period-1.
3. Cash-flow realization from the production technology.
4. Loan repayment.
5. Period-2 consumption
We would like to note that in this model the exact timing of k investment is not too essential.
All we need is that k is invested before the liquidity injection is made. This means allowing parts of
the saving for business purposes s to finance k, which can be reached by changing the timing of events
(2) and (3) in period-1 timeline, will not alter the qualitative properties of the model that we highlight
in section 2.4.
2.2 Optimizing Behavior
The endogenous variables in this model are c1,i, c2,i, k1,i, and s1,i. Entrepreneurs maximize life-time
preferences delineated at (1) - with respect to the endogenous variables - subject to
c1,i + k1,i + s1,i ≤ ω, (3)
c2,i ≤ Aik1,i + s1,iζi, (4)
where (3) and (4) are the budget constraints for period-1 and period-2 respectively. We would like to
note that `2k1,i enters both sides of the constraint (4); and hence, gets cancelled out. An immediate
implication of this model can be summarized with the following.
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Lemma 2.1 If and only if k1,i > 0, the entrepreneur forecasts that there will be sufficient capacity
to finance future liquidity needs. Therefore, the entrepreneur sets k1,i = 0 if his capacity to finance
liquidity is sufficiently low.
This result implies that as long as k1,i > 0 we have two additional constraints that need to
hold:
L(k1,i) ≤ s1,iζi + b2,i, (5)
θiL(k1,i) ≥ b2,i. (6)
The qualitative properties of this model are then as follows. Entrepreneurs who choose a
k1,i > 0, exhaust their borrowing limit θi. This is implied by the assumption that saving is inefficient
(ζi < ζF = 1) in this economy for informal type of saving practices. Therefore,
b2,i = θiL(k1,i), (7)
as long as ζi < 1.







Equation (8) implies that the lower ζ the higher is the amount of savings for business purposes - for
those entrepreneurs who choose to invest. But, as we show below a low ζ implies a low likelihood of
earnings retention and as a result a low likelihood of saving for business purposes.
Using (8) in budget constraints (3) and (4) yields:






c2 = Aik1,i + (1− θi)L(k1,i). (10)
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Letting the idiosyncratic rate of return from postponing consumption from period-1 to period-2
be denoted with ρi, the optimal consumption plans implied by (1) are described as:








Finally, using (9), (10) and the optimal consumption plans from (11) we can show that the
entrepreneur chooses to invest (k1,i > 0) in period-1 if and only if:
ρi ≡








The left hand side of the inequality (12) is the unit rate of return from undertaking an investment
project for an entrepreneur i. The right hand side is the unit cost of postponing consumption from
period-1 to period-2. The entrepreneurs with high enough ρ - ρi > 1/β - invest in their projects
and consume the investment returns at the end of the period-2. When ρi is lower than 1/β, the
entrepreneur does not invest and consumes the endowment ω at the end of the period-1.
2.3 Empirically testable implications of the model
Applying comparative statics at (12) we capture the key empirically testable implication of the model
in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.2 Entrepreneurs with an efficient saving practice (high ζi) are more likely to invest.







)`2(1− θ)(A+ (1− θ)`2)[1 + `2 (1−θζ )]2
 > 0,
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which implies that the rate of return from investing rises with the efficiency of the saving
practice of the entrepreneur. A higher efficiency of an entrepreneur’s saving practice therefore also
raises the likelihood of earnings reinvestment, the key hypothesis of our empirical analysis. 
In order to deepen the empirical validity of our theoretical model, we also provide the following
two propositions.
Proposition 2.3 Entrepreneurs with a high borrowing capacity (high θi) are more likely to invest.
Proof Defining z ≡ 1−θ
ζ2









which implies that the rate of return from investing rises with the entrepreneur’s borrowing capacity.

Proposition 2.4 Productive entrepreneurs (high Ai) are more likely to invest.







where again z ≡ 1−θ
ζ2
, shows that the rate of return from investment rises with entrepreneurial ability.

2.4 Endogenizing the Saving Practice
Our theoretical model implies that if an entrepreneur’s saving practice is inefficient, then she is induced
to save a lot which makes investment, or in other words postponing consumption between period-1
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and period-2, harder. Therefore, the saving practice of an entrepreneur is likely to be an endogenous
variable, where the decision to save formally might be a costly action.
To formalize this argument, suppose that there are two saving options available for an en-
trepreneur as spelled out previously - formal and informal. In order to be able to save formally the
entrepreneur needs to sacrifice a utility loss worth of ψi units of consumption for each unit of fund
deposited formally. This basically implies that formal savings impose a non-monetary cost for a class
of agents. The utility loss might be due to social costs (e.g. hiding savings from family members
at a bank account) or physical costs (e.g. transportation costs) as well as idiosyncratic factors. In
addressing the potential reverse causation of investment on entrepreneurial saving practice in section
6, we will utilize entrepreneur’s Age, Age2, and Distance to the nearest bank as instruments in order
to capture the utility loss implied by bank transactions costs.
The efficiency of the formal saving practice is denoted with ζF and the efficiency of the informal
saving practice is denoted with ζI , where ζF = 1 > ζI for all I individuals who save informally. Using
equation (12) from the entrepreneurial optimization problem, an entrepreneur i is willing to save
formally if and only if












 > ψi, (13)
which would hold if (a) the entrepreneur has a low cost of accessing formal financial institutions and/or
(b) a high enough productivity and/or (c) limited access to borrowing.
We utilize the theoretical argument we derived at equation (13), when we study the reverse
causation of re-investment likelihood on entrepreneurial saving practice in section 6.
2.5 Impact Heterogeneity
The entrepreneurial (in)efficiency associated with informal saving practices is expected to be a function
of accessibility to savings. Such accessibility constraints could be related to the repayment structure
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for the case of informal saving networks (e.g. ROSCAs) and to household bargaining power for the case
of in-household savings. This implies, for instance, that entrepreneurs with low household bargaining
power would have a lower ζI . The bargaining power of an individual could vary according to the
position of the individual in the household. For instance, due to social norms and pressures female
household members, children, and siblings are naturally at a more disadvantageous position than
males and household heads in terms of claiming from the common resources of the household. They
are less likely to claim money from the common savings pot of the household to finance their liquidity
needs and are therefore less likely to reinvest. We will utilize this intuition when studying impact
heterogeneity in section 6.
2.6 Empirically Testable Hypotheses
In our regression equations we will control for a vector of variables to test the theoretical results we
obtained in propositions 2.1 through 2.3. Specifically, the empirically testable hypotheses resulting
from our model are the following:
1. Entrepreneurs who save efficiently (high ζ) are more likely to invest.
2. Entrepreneurs with a high borrowing capacity (high θ) are more likely to invest.
3. Entrepreneurs with better training, higher education and higher income (high A) are more likely
to invest.
3 The Empirical Methodology
We test the hypotheses derived from the theoretical model with a dataset collected from Tanzanian
MSEs by the Financial Sector Deepening Trust of Tanzania. To test whether saving practices affect
the decision to reinvest, we use the binary outcome variable reinvest, which equals 1 if the entrepreneur
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invests some of the profits back into business, and estimate the following model
Reinvesti = α + γ
′Si + χ
′Controlsi + εi, (14)
where i denotes the entrepreneur, S is a vector of saving practices comprised of dummy variable(s)
which take(s) the value of 1 if the entrepreneur has the corresponding saving practice (see below for
details) and ε is the error term. Since our dependent variable is binary, we estimate probit models for
all different specifications of (14), and report marginal effects at mean levels for the coefficient estimates
unless we state otherwise. The vector of control variables included in the benchmark model is composed
of an array of entrepreneurial and enterprise characteristics that we discuss in the following.
First, in line with our theoretical model, we control for firms’ past borrowing history. Specifi-
cally, Borrowed is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the entrepreneur has ever borrowed
to cover business needs, and it is a proxy for the θi parameter in the theoretical model. Businesses
that have access to external finance are expected to reinvest more frequently even in the absence of
regular entrepreneurial savings.
Second, we use income level, education and business training history of entrepreneurs as proxies
of entrepreneurial productivity Ai. We conjecture that entrepreneurs with a higher household income
can save more and as a result reinvest more often. To control for the income effects, we use self-
reported monthly personal income levels.4 Entrepreneurs with a high human capital are expected to
be more committed to business growth, and to have higher rates of earnings retention. We therefore
use the highest level of formal education completed by the respondents, as well as an indicator of
entrepreneurial training, as this should matter for expected business performance and reinvestment
behavior.
Third, although they are not discussed in our model, we additionally control for gender and
marital status as previous studies showed that both can influence investment decisions (Iversen et al.,
2006; Ashraf, 2009; de Mel et al., 2009 and Fafchamps et al., 2013). Specifically, we expect female
entrepreneurs to face more claims on their income from spouse and family members. Similarly, married
4Each respondent is asked which income range (e.g. TSHS 35 001 - TSHS 40 000 per month) describes their income
level best. We use the median of that range (e.g. TSHS 37500.5) as the income level of the respondent.
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entrepreneurs might face more claimants on the business profits and might therefore be less likely to
re-invest. Finally, we include sectoral dummies to control for sectoral performance that might explain
reinvestment heterogeneity, as well as regional dummies to control for geographic heterogeneity in
profitability and reinvestment.
We empirically explore the relationship between specific forms of saving and the likelihood
of reinvestment. Specifically, our survey allows us to identify two types of saving practices among
Tanzanian entrepreneurs which we classify as follows:
1. Save formal : This practice includes the entrepreneurs who save their funds at formal financial
institutions such as commercial banks, microfinance institutions or saving & credit cooperatives.
So entrepreneurs who save only formal and save both formal and informal (please see below for
the definitions ) means are considered in this group.
2. Save informal : We consider entrepreneurs who do not save formally in this group.
This separation corresponds to the control-treatment group set-up of many randomized con-
trol trials that assess the impact of using formal savings products on household and entrepreneurial
outcomes. In addition, however, our survey allows a finer classification to exploit the considerable
heterogeneity in terms of informal saving practices. Therefore we first divide save informal into two
groups and distinguish individual saving practices and practices involving interaction with other people
as follows:
1. Save informal individually : A large fraction of entrepreneurs in Tanzania save their funds only in
a secret hiding place or piggy bank.5 We classify this behaviour as “informal individual saving”
practice.
2. Save informal with others : We classify the practices of saving funds via informal savings clubs,
such as ROSCAs, or moneylenders or within household savers under “saving with others”. We
5Piggy bank is a coin container.
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do not include respondents who also save formally in this group. Entrepreneurs who both save
informal individually and save informally with others are considered in this group.6
To distinguish whether our entrepreneurs save through people living in the household or people
who are not member of a household, we decompose the practice of “Save informal with others” further
into two groups.
1. Save with household members : The group comprises of entrepreneurs who give their funds to
other household members to keep them safe.
2. Save with people outside household : The group contains entrepreneurs who save through ROSCAs
or moneylenders. The entrepreneurs who both save informal with household members and save
informal with people outside household are considered in this group.7
We again conjecture that entrepreneurs in the second group have more control over their savings
than entrepreneurs in the first group, especially if the latter have limited intra-household bargaining
power. In our regression analysis, we will use a dummy variable for each saving practice above (see
Table 1 below for the descriptions) and work with different samples to compare both savers and
non-savers but also different groups of savers in their reinvestment behaviour.
4 The Data
The dataset is based on a novel enterprise survey conducted at the MSE-level in Tanzania. The
survey data was collected by the Financial Sector Deepening Trust Tanzania in 2010 from a nationwide
representative cross-section of 6,083 micro- and small enterprises. The respondents of the questionnaire
are entrepreneurs with an active business as of September 2010. Table 1 presents both detailed
definitions of the variables and descriptive statistics of the sample.
6Our results are robust when we create a separate dummy variable for this group having both saving practices and
add them to the regressions.
7We do not include the respondents having both practices, saving informal both with people outside household and
with household members, to our main regression specifications as only a few respondents (7) do both.
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- Table 1 about here -
The descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table 1 shows that the average number of employees
among Tanzanian MSEs is 1.5 workers, ranging from one (i.e. self-employed) to 80 employees.8 How-
ever, 97% of entrepreneurs are self-employed. The median initial capital is about 35 USD and average
monthly sales are 149 USD. The key question which we exploit to capture entrepreneurs’ earnings
retention asks whether the respondent reinvests some of the profits back into business. As we present
in Table 1, 76% of the sample entrepreneurs engage in earnings retention.
The sectoral breakdown in Panel B of Table 1 exhibits substantial variation: 54% and 30% of
the businesses operate in the trade and service sectors, respectively, while 15% of enterprises operate
in manufacturing.
Panel C of Table 1 presents characteristics of entrepreneurs and enterprises. About 50% of
the entrepreneurs in the sample are female, 10% of the entrepreneurs are single. 30% of the sample
entrepreneurs received business related training, and about 87% of the entrepreneurs have less than
completed secondary education. 75% of the enterprises are located in rural areas. The median monthly
personal income of entrepreneurs is 106 USD.9
Panel D of Table 1, finally, presents our variables and descriptive statistics on the financing
patterns of enterprises in our sample. Only 18% of all sample entrepreneurs ever borrowed for business
purposes; 3% of entrepreneurs in the sample borrowed from a bank or MFI, 2% borrowed from a
semi-formal financial institution, such as a SACCO or village bank and 6% borrowed from an informal
source, such as money lenders, savings club or family and friends.
Saving is a common habit among the entrepreneurs in our sample. We utilize an extensive
margin question asking whether the entrepreneur saves for business purposes, and distinguish savers
from the rest of the population: 77% of the entrepreneurs in the sample save for business purposes.
8The relationship between business owners’s saving and re-investment decisions might be weak in large businesses
because of managerial layers. We test the robustness of our main result by excluding the businesses larger than 10 from
our sample. Estimates reported in Table 3 do not change.
9This is computed with the average exchange rate for 2010. If using PPP exchange rates, the corresponding median
income would be 288 dollars.
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However there is considerable heterogeneity among saving practices of Tanzanian entrepreneurs. In-
formal individual saving is the most popular practice among Tanzanian entrepreneurs. 75% of the
savers save informal-individually whereas around 13% of them save formally. Likewise, 13% of the
savers do not save at a formal financial institution and instead save their funds via people outside the
household such as members of ROSCAs and moneylenders or give them to household members.
Table 2 presents a correlation matrix concerning the variables of interest for our analysis. The
key variables such as “being a saver” and “retaining earnings within the business” exhibit a strong
correlation. However, the sign of the relationship seems to be dependent on the saving practice of the
respondents. In particular saving via others seems to be negatively correlated with firm reinvestment
whereas formal and informal individual savers have higher reinvestment rates. We also note a high
correlation among other firm characteristics, such as borrowing and saving activity.
- Table 2 about here -
5 Saving Practices and Reinvestment: Main Results
Table 3 reports the marginal effects for the benchmark regression. We use heteroscedasticity robust
standard errors and report the standard deviations associated with coefficient estimates in parentheses.
- Table 3 about here -
The results in the first column show that the probability of reinvestment is higher for both
groups of savers compared to non-savers. Specifically, ceteris paribus, the reinvestment probability of
an average Tanzanian MSE who saves informally is around six percentage points higher than for an
entrepreneur who does not save, while the reinvestment probability of an average Tanzanian MSE who
saves formally is around nine percentage points higher. We also find that entrepreneurs with access
to formal loans are more likely to reinvest, while formal business training increases the likelihood
of reinvestment in business projects. Female and married entrepreneurs are less likely, while richer
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entrepreneurs are more likely to invest. Overall, these results are consistent with our theoretical
predictions as discussed above and the existing literature.
Our empirical analysis, so far, stresses the significance of entrepreneurial savings to foster
entrepreneurial reinvestment in business projects and we confirmed that saving related correlations
are in line with the findings in the literature. In the next step, we focus on our main research question
and we deepen our analysis by studying the implications of saving practices on reinvestment. In order
to test the predictions from our theoretical model, we rank saving practices based on their vulnerability
to consumption temptations - as we discussed above - and investigate the implications of the variations
in saving methods for the probability to reinvest. Specifically, we rank the “within household savers”
as the group for whom the vulnerability to consuming savings is the highest. On the other extreme,
we expect the most committed savers to be “formal savers” due to the highest opportunity cost of
consumption - resulting from the foregone interest income. Finally, comparing “informal individual
savers” with “informal savers with others”, we conjecture that while the redistributive pressure problem
might be lower for the former, there would be a potential inflexibility to withdrawing savings when
needed associated with the latter.
Here we also note that we study our main research question by focusing on specific sub-samples
of savers in order to present the results clearer, and keep the consistency between the samples used
for main estimations, robustness checks and bivariate probit estimates (see below). To show that our
estimates are not biased due to this method, we replicate the analysis by using the entire sample. We
present the results in Table A1 in the Appendix, and show that our estimates are robust.10
The results in column 2 show that “formal savers” are four percent more likely to retain earn-
ings than the “informal savers”. To investigate the effects of individual saving practices on earnings
retention we limit our sample to savers and thus drop respondents who do not save. The results in
column 3 show that entrepreneurs who save with others are less likely to reinvest than entrepreneurs
who save formally. Also, entrepreneurs who save informally but individually are not significantly less
likely to reinvest when compared to “formal savers”.
10The only difference between the results concerns the estimate for save with people outside the household. It is
statistically significant at ten percent level due to lower standard error estimates when we use the full sample.
22
Finally, we focus on the group of respondents who save with others. We independently study the
investment likelihood of household savers and respondents who save outside the household compared
to the reinvestment probability of formal savers. The regression in column (4) keeps only formal
savers and household member savers in our sample, while the regression in column (5) keeps only
formal savers and outside household savers in our sample. In both cases, we gauge the difference
in reinvestment behaviour relative to formal savers. Therefore, the total numbers of observations in
these two regressions are 877 and 774, respectively. Confirming our conjecture, we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that “with household member savers” reinvest less frequently compared to “formal
savers”, at the 5% level. Furthermore, we also show that, although the coefficient estimate of Save
with people outside household variable in the last regression is not significant, the negative coefficient
sign is consistent with the argument that the inflexible withdrawal opportunity of “informal savings”
might be a barrier to earnings retention.
In summary, our baseline empirical results are consistent with our theoretical model showing
that inefficient saving practices lead to lower likelihood of reinvestment. They suggest that informal
saving practices are associated with significantly lower likelihood of earnings retention compared to
formal saving mechanisms. It is important to note that this finding is mainly driven by the difference
in the reinvestment likelihood of within household savers and formal savers, for which the difference
is most pronounced and statistically significant.
6 Robustness, Reverse Causality, and Heterogeneity
While controlling for other enterprise and entrepreneurial characteristics reduces the risk that the
relationship between savings patterns and the likelihood of reinvestment is a spurious one, we cannot
exclude the possibility that our relationship is driven by different sources of endogeneity, including
reverse causation and omitted variable bias. As we show in our theoretical model, entrepreneurs who
are more willing to reinvest might look for saving practices that support their investment efforts. In
this section, we focus on the sample of formal and within-household savers once more since our key
result from the empirical analysis of section 5 is that “within household savers” are less likely to re-
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invest than “formal savers”. Focusing on only one sub-sample also has a methodological advantage as
we need fewer exogenous determinants to identify the relationship. We conduct a series of checks to
ensure the robustness of our key result concerning the difference in reinvestment likelihood between
formal and within household savers (see column (4) in Table 3) to inclusion and exclusion of additional
control variables, alternative model specifications and to address endogeneity biases. The section is
organized as follows. In subsection, 6.1 we address concerns regarding the non-linear modelling choice.
Subsections 6.2 and 6.3 present robustness checks for the omitted variable bias. In subsection 6.4 we
utilize an instrumental variable approach and circumvent the reverse causality concerns. Finally, in
6.5 we conduct an analysis to illustrate the heterogeneity of our estimates in sub-samples of data.
6.1 Mis-specification
At first, we address the potential mis-specification of our non-linear probit model. Table 4 provides a
set of regression results from an alternative linear model specification - using Ordinary Least Square
(OLS) estimation. As linear regression results reported in columns (1)-(5) of Table 4 indicate, our
coefficient estimates are consistent and significant, hence stable vis-a-vis our baseline probit regression
estimates. Specifically, the OLS estimation shows that saving informally is negatively correlated with
the likelihood of earnings retention compared to the formal saving mechanism, and this negative co-
variance is significantly driven by the practice of saving with other household members.
- Table 4 about here -
In column 6 of Table 4 we also provide estimation results, where we use a matching model.
We do this, because a non-linear correlation between our key explanatory variable - that derives the
negative co-variance between saving informal and re-investment (save with household members) - and
the control variables may bias our estimates, and we can eliminate this bias by using a matching
estimator. By matching each entrepreneur who saves with household members in our study with three
(nearest) counterfactual entrepreneurs who save formally (households saving formally), - on the basis
of the control variables listed in section 3 and column 4 of Table 3 - we do not assume linear selection
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on observables and avoid a bias due to misspecification of the empirical functional form. The results
from matching model confirm our previous findings.
6.2 Stability of the Estimates: Removing k-control variables
As a check of omitted variable bias, we provide a stability test for our key regressions with saving
with household members in the spirit of Altonji et al. (2005). Specifically, as Bellows and Miguel
(2009) propose, we first estimate a parsimonious model and then add control variables gradually. The
results in Table 5 show that our marginal effect estimates in columns (1)-(6) are highly stable across
different specifications. We measure the stability of marginal effects by calculating the ratio between
the value in the regression including controls (numerator) - column (6) - and the difference between
this effect and the one derived from a regression without covariates (denominator) - column (1) . As
Bellows and Miguel (2009) suggest, this ratio shows how strong the covariance between the unobserved
factors explaining entrepreneurial reinvestment decision and savings practices needs to be, relative to
the covariance between observable factors and savings practices, to explain away the entire effect we
find. The ratio is -411, which suggests that to explain the full effect of save within household, the
covariance between unobserved factors and savings practices needs to be more than four times as high
as the covariance of the included control variables with saving practices.12 We would like to highlight
that in these regressions even adding region fixed effects does not significantly alter our coefficient
estimates although adding regional dummies increases pseudo R-square to approximately 4 times, and
regional dummies explain most of the variation in the model.
- Table 5 about here -
11If we calculate this ratio with OLS instead of probit, as Bellows and Miguel (2009) do, we obtain a ratio of -2.6 –
leaving our interpretations unaltered.
12In a similar set-up, Altonji et al. (2005) find a ratio of 3.55. The interpretation is that the larger the ratio, the
lower the likelihood of unobservables to explain away the entire effect.
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6.3 Including Additional Control Variables
As an additional test of omitted variable bias, in Table 6, we test the robustness of our key result
with respect to the inclusion of a vector of additional control variables. First, we add specific dummy
variables for different sources of external finance at the start-up of the enterprise: formal, semi-formal
and informal loans. Our indicator for external finance may not capture the potential implications of
access to different sources of finance for reinvestment decisions. Getting loans from a formal financial
institution might require a bank account and facilitate formal entrepreneurial savings. However, none
of the external financing variables that we include have significant explanatory power for reinvestment
likelihood. Second, we control for entrepreneurial types by utilizing the answers to the following
survey question: “why did you go to business?”13 As evidenced in the previous literature (Bruhn
and Zia (2011)), transformational type entrepreneurs are expected to have higher rates of investment
profitability and earnings retention rate compared to survival type entrepreneurs. While we do not
report the individual dummy variables, some variables enter significant at the 5% level. Third, we
add dummy variables to control for the type of the activity the business conducts. The activity of
the business (e.g. buying and re-selling; buying, adding value and re-selling, providing a service etc.)
may change the definition of re-investment for business owner and timing of the reinvestment. For
instance, they may be different for a restaurant owner and a market vendor. To control for this
factor, we include answers to the question “what does your business do?” as dummy variables.14 The
estimates for the variables are jointly significant at the 1 percent level. To economize on space we do
not report estimates; they are available upon request. Fourth, we include the size of the logarithm of
the initial start-up capital, the logarithm of current sales per employee, the logarithm of the duration of
business and the logarithm of number of workers since these size gauges are expected to determine the
growth potential of a business- and hence the profitability of reinvestment. We also control for rural
vs. urban location of the enterprise, as the accessibility to infrastructure might affect expectations
13Entrepreneurs selected from a list of statements to indicate why they went into business. Multiple choices were
available. The answers include: I was fired / lost/retrenched from a previous job; I couldn’t find a job elsewhere; To
support me / my family; To try out a business idea; I believe I can make more money working for myself than for
someone else; I had nothing else to do/no other means of survival/no better option; parents / relatives were in business;
I saw a good opportunity; I have always wanted my own business; I was encouraged by friends and relatives; I needed
to supplement my income; Others, please specify.
14We include 5 separate dummy variables for the businesses buying and selling goods; buying, adding value and selling
goods; making and selling goods; providing service; and other activities including agricultural ones.
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and drive variations in reinvestment rates. Including all of these control variables does not affect our
key empirical finding.
- Table 6 about here -
Finally, in column (2) we replace the region fixed effects with district fixed effects to ensure that
we are capturing geographical variations well enough that could explain the probability of reinvestment.
While our sample becomes smaller, our findings remain.15
6.4 Instrumental Variable Analysis
In this subsection, we investigate the relationship between saving choices and entrepreneurial char-
acteristics, and then offer a test to alleviate endogeneity concerns. To investigate the determinants
of saving choice, we replace the dependent variable reinvest with save within household in (14) and
regress it on our list of control variables as well as on two additional variables denoted by ψi in our
theoretical model: Age of the entrepreneur and distance to bank. Age increases the bargaining power
of the entrepreneur within the household and this implies a U-shaped relationship between age and the
choice of within household saving. On the one hand, agents are less likely to be forced to save within
household as they get older. On the other hand, when they reach an age giving them enough power to
protect their savings within the household, they may be more likely to save with household members.
The distance to the nearest bank is expected to increase accessibility of “formal savings services”. We
estimate two models with two different measures of distance to formal financial institutions. The first
one is a subjective distance measure constructed by using the question from the enterprise survey: Is
there any bank branch in one hour walking distance to your house? However, there might be a concern
regarding the subjective measure, as entrepreneurs who search for formal savings instruments are also
those who are more likely to know of the existence of a bank in the close proximity. Therefore, the
correlation between the search intensity and some unobserved characteristics may bias our results. For
15Note that when we include district fixed effects the total number of observations in the regression decreases to 650
because some districts are excluded from the regression in Probit estimations due to perfect prediction. Our estimates
are robust when we estimate the same model with OLS and do not lose any observations.
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this reason, we estimate a model with an additional objective distance measure, the logarithm of ward
level minimum distance to the closest bank branch, MFI or ATM in 2013 which we constructed using
data from the Financial Services Map.16
Table 7 reports the marginal effect from probit estimations for the saving practice choice. In
columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 we present the results for models including subjective and objective
measures, respectively. As we conjecture, the likelihood of saving with household members is higher
when entrepreneurs are closer to banks. Moreover, as the age of the entrepreneur increases, he or
she is less likely to save with household members. The positive coefficient (0.00038) on the square
of age indicates that the age saving with household members practice relationship is non-linear and
U-shaped. As the age of the entrepreneur increases, the impact of the age on the saving practice
decreases, and getting older increase the probability of saving with household members after the age
of 52. The rest of the estimates are also in line with our theory. Entrepreneurs who have access to
external finance and entrepreneurs with higher education, better training or high income are more
likely to save formally. Finally, female entrepreneurs seem more likely to save in formal institutions
- perhaps to escape from redistributive pressures. Also, non-married entrepreneurs are more likely to
save formally.
- Table 7 about here -
To address the endogoneity concerns in the relationship between savings practices and en-
trepreneurial reinvestment decisions, we use an instrumental variable methodology which makes use
of the determinants of saving practice choice. Since our dependent and main explanatory variables
are binary, we use a system approach, and utilize the age of the entrepreneur and her distance to the
nearest bank as instruments in a nonlinear recursive bivariate probit model.17 Specifically the model
16We use data from the Financial Services Map for Tanzania. This data set gives geographic coordinates of bank
branches, MFIs and ATMs in 2013 acrossTanzania. We match these data with the existing geographic coordinates of
the wards from which entrepreneurial data are collected. Then we calculate the distance of the wards to each financial
unit and pick the minimum distance.
17We also estimate the same model by using the 2SLS method. We have the same expected signs for the variables
of interest but the coefficient estimates are bigger and imprecise as the variance increases. We believe this is because
both the dependent and independent variables of interest are binary. Chibus et al. (2012) suggests 2SLS may give very
different results and imprecise estimates if the number of observations is lower than 5000 (in our case it is 877).
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is formulated as follows:
Reinvesti = φ+ δSavehouseholdi + η
′Controlsi + σi, (15)
Savehouseholdi = λ+ κ
′Zi + π
′Controlsi + ui. (16)
We assume that error terms σi and ui are distributed via bivariate normal distribution. So, E[σi] = 0,
E[ui] = 0 and cov[σi, ui] = µ. We identify the system by using the vector Z which includes the distance
to bank measure and age of the entrepreneur as well as its square and use a similar set of controls as
in the main specifications.18 Table 8 presents the key regressions that we utilize to identify causality
between the saving practice and the likelihood of reinvestment.
- Table 8 about here -
There may be exogeneity concerns regarding the relationship between the instruments and
reinvestment. For instance, older entrepreneurs may be less likely to reinvest in their businesses.
Distance to banks might correlate with business opportunities and induce entrepreneurs to reinvest.
In order to address these issues, in columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 we test the exogeneity of our
instruments. The standard overidentification test for the 2SLS is not an option with Bivariate Probit
estimation. However, it is empirically possible to provide test statistics and argue that our instruments
are likely to meet exclusion restrictions. In this respect, at first, we utilize an informal test procedure
commonly applied in the empirical literature (e.g. Egger et al. (2011); Booker et al. (2013)), where we
introduce our instruments - Age, Age2 and Distance - into the benchmark reinvestment regression and
study the coefficient estimates. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 we show that the coefficient estimates
of the instruments are not statistically significant when we include them as additional explanatory
variables in our reinvestment regressions together with our main explanatory variable. This implies
that the instruments are correlated with saving practices, but they do not co-vary with reinvestment.
Second, we show that the estimated cross-correlation coefficient - which we denote with µ̂ in Table 8
- is not statistically significant in either estimation. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
18We do not use sector dummies in the bivariate probit estimations since our model does not converge. However, not
using sector dummies does not change our results since our main results shown in Table 3 are robust when we do not
control for them.
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that σi and ui are uncorrelated or reinvestment is exogenous to saving practice choice, once we control
for other entrepreneurial characteristics. We also test the joint significance of our exogenous variables
in the first stage of our bivariate probit model: they are jointly significant at the 1 percent level (Chi-
square>20 and p-value<0.001 for both specifications). Finally, we would like to highlight another point
concerning the validity of distance measures as instruments. While it is likely that distance to banks
- or the density of banks in a region - correlate with local economic environment, which might impact
saving practices as well as the local investment opportunities, we control for district fixed effects in our
first-stage, which should control for the local economic development level, and this should therefore
be a negligible concern for the validity of the distance instrument.
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 we present the recursive bivariate-probit estimates by using
age in both models, and the two different distance measures as our instruments. Also, Table A2 in
the Appendix shows detailed estimation results for the model, including the control variables. The
instrumental variable estimations reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 confirm our results. The
coefficient estimate of save with household member remains negative and significant for both instrument
sets. Different measures of distance produce similar results thereby minimizing the concerns regarding
the validity of the distance-to-bank proxies. We also note that the estimates for the exogenous variables
have the expected signs. The probability to save in the household decreases as the proximity to bank
decreases and entrepreneur gets older.
6.5 Heterogeneity
As we discussed in section 2.6, we expect heterogeneous reinvestment responses with respect to the
within-household saving practice. Therefore, in order to deepen our analysis and strengthen our
identification, we present a set of impact heterogeneity results in Table 9. Specifically, we compare
the reinvestment behaviour of entrepreneurs who save with household members with the reinvestment
behaviour of entrepreneurs who use formal savings mechanisms across the following two sample splits.
First, we split the sample into female and male entrepreneurs. Theory and empirical evidence suggests
that social constraints on accessibility of saved funds is higher for women compared to men. Second,
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we split the sample into entrepreneurs that are household heads and entrepreneurs that are spouses,
children or siblings. We expect the social constraints to be less strong for household heads.
The results in Table 9 confirm the differential relationships between household savings and
reinvestment decisions. The results reveal that the marginal effects of Save with household members
on reinvestment are larger and more significant for female and non-head family members. While the
negative relationship between saving within the household and reinvestment decisions are significant
at least at the 10% level for all groups, the economic significance is large for female, non-household
heads. Supporting our theoretical predictions, this result implies that entrepreneurs who are in disad-
vantageous positions in their households are more negatively affected from inefficient saving practices.
- Table 9 about here -
7 Conclusion
Past research has identified several factors that are important for entrepreneurial investment in devel-
oping countries. In this study, we explored how different entrepreneurial saving practices - i.e. saving
via formal financial institutions, individually (under the mattress), within the household or within
informal arrangements, such as ROSCAs - are related with the likelihood of reinvestment. To this
end, we used a novel survey data set collected from MSEs in Tanzania and distinguished multiple sav-
ing practices of entrepreneurs as well their earnings retention behaviour. We motivated our empirical
research with a simple theoretical model that shows how different saving practices can influence invest-
ment decisions. We have three key empirical results. First, we show that saving and the probability
of reinvestment are significantly correlated. Second, we provide evidence that entrepreneurs who save
by giving funds to other household members are less likely to reinvest than formal savers. Third, we
document that the difference in the likelihood of reinvestment across saving practices is significantly
higher for those entrepreneurs who potentially have low bargaining power in the household. We ad-
dress endogeneity concerns and also provide an extensive list of robustness checks that confirm our
results.
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Our findings suggest that the entrepreneurs who need to protect their savings from consump-
tion commitments of other household members may benefit most from the introduction of formal
saving instruments in low income areas. Therefore, from a development policy perspective, targeting
entrepreneurs who have low decision power in the household and facilitating their access to formal
saving instruments could be thought as a priority. Our results have important implications for the
interactions between enterprise performance and financial access as well. Enterprises that exploit rein-
vestment opportunities are expected to be more likely to sustain higher productivity levels and survive
more often. Access to efficient saving mechanisms in this respect could be key to facilitate enterprise
performance in financially developing societies.
Our research raises also some new issues regarding the implications of savings practices of
entrepreneurs. First, why do savers inside households not open a bank account to save? Although we
implicitly show proximity to banks as an important factor to save in a formal account, identification
of all factors is not in the scope of this study. Second, what is the exact role of pressure inside the
household that does not allow earnings retention? These important questions we leave to future work.
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Table 3: Regressions for reinvestment and saving/saving practices relationship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Save formal 0.09***
(0.02)
Save informal 0.06*** -0.04*
(0.01) (0.02)
Save informal individually -0.03
(0.02)
Save informal with others -0.09***
(0.03)
Save with household members -0.12***
(0.04)
Save with people outside household -0.04
(0.03)
Borrowed 0.04** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Education 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female -0.03** -0.03** -0.03*** -0.07** -0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Single 0.04** 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
No training -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.07** -0.06**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Income 0.03*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 5,803 4,499 4,499 877 774
Sample All Savers Savers Formal and Formal and
household others
savers savers
Base category No Save Save Save Save
saving formal formal formal formal
Notes: This table shows our baseline estimation results for the relationship between saving practices, control variables and reinvestment
likelihood. The detailed variable definitions are given in Table 1. Reinvestment is the dependent variable in the estimations. We estimate
Probit models for all specifications in columns 1 to 5 and report marginal effects estimates at mean values for all variables and robust
standard errors in parentheses. To control for unobserved regional and sector level fixed effects, we add sector and and region dummies to
all estimations. The details of the estimations in the columns 1 to 5 are as follows: (1) In column 1, we compare the reinvestment likelihood
of formal and informal savers with non-savers. We use our entire sample for this estimation. The estimate for Save formal (informal) shows
the difference between the impact of Save formal (informal) and not saving (base category) on reinvestment likelihood. (2) In column 2,
we compare the reinvestment performance of informal savers with formal saver by restricting our sample to only savers and dropping the
respondents who do not save. The estimate for Save informal shows the difference between the impact of Save informal and Save formal
(base category) on reinvestment likelihood. (3) In column 3, we disentangle informal saving practices to saving informal individually and
saving informal with others by adding separate dummies for each group. The estimate for Save informal individually (Save informal with
others) shows the difference between the impact of Save informal individually (Save informal with others) and Save formal (base category)
on reinvestment likelihood. (4) In column 4, we compare reinvestment likelihood of household savers with formal savers by keeping only
formal savers and household member savers in our sample. The estimate for Save informal with household members shows the difference
between the impact of Save informal with household members and Save formal (base category) on reinvestment likelihood. (5) In column
5, we compare reinvestment likelihood of outside household savers with formal savers by keeping only formal savers and outside household
savers in our sample. The estimate for Save informal with people outside household shows the difference between the impact of Save
informal with people outside household and Save formal (base category) on reinvestment likelihood. p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01
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Table 4: Estimates for reinvestment and saving/saving practices relationship by using OLS and match-
ing estimators
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Save formal 0.10***
(0.02)
Save informal 0.06*** -0.03*
(0.01) (0.02)
Save informal individually -0.02
(0.02)
Save informal with others -0.08***
(0.02)
Save with household members -0.11*** -0.12***
(0.03) (0.00)
Save with people outside household -0.04
(0.04)
Borrowed 0.04** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04 0.04
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Education 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female -0.03** -0.03** -0.03*** -0.06** -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Single 0.04** 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05)
No training -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.07** -0.06**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Income 0.03*** 0.01** 0.02** 0.03** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.53*** 0.54*** 0.53*** 0.71*** 0.31
(0.07) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.22)
Observations 5,803 4,499 4,499 877 774 877
R-squared 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.22 0.17
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS NN Matching
Sample All Savers Savers Formal and Formal and Formal and
household others household
savers savers savers
Base category No Save Save Save Save Save
saving formal formal formal formal formal
Notes: This table shows our baseline estimation results for the relationship between saving practices, control variables and reinvestment
likelihood. The detailed variable definitions are given in Table 1. Reinvestment is the dependent variable in the estimations. We estimate
OLS models for all specifications in columns 1 to 5 and use propensity score matching method for the estimation shown in column 6.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. To control for unobserved regional and sector level fixed effects, we add sector and and region
dummies to all estimations. The details of the estimations in the columns 1 to 6 are as follows: (1) In columns 1 to 5, we replicate the
estimations shown in Table 3 by using OLS method instead of Probit. we compare the reinvestment likelihood of formal and informal savers
with non-savers. We use our entire sample for this estimation. The estimate for Save formal (informal) shows the difference between the
impact of Save formal (informal) and not saving (base category) on reinvestment likelihood. (2) In column 2, we compare the reinvestment
performance of informal savers with formal saver by restricting our sample to only savers and dropping the respondents who do not save.
The estimate for Save informal shows the difference between the impact of Save informal and Save formal (base category) on reinvestment
likelihood. (3) In column 3, we disentangle informal saving practices to saving informal individually and saving informal with others by
adding separate dummies for each group. The estimate for Save informal individually (Save informal with others) shows the difference
between the impact of Save informal individually (Save informal with others) and Save formal (base category) on reinvestment likelihood.
(4) In column 4, we compare reinvestment likelihood of household savers with formal savers by keeping only formal savers and household
member savers in our sample. The estimate for Save informal with household members shows the difference between the impact of Save
informal with household members and Save formal (base category) on reinvestment likelihood. (5) In column 5, we compare reinvestment
likelihood of outside household savers with formal savers by keeping only formal savers and outside household savers in our sample. The
estimate for Save informal with people outside household shows the difference between the impact of Save informal with people outside
household and Save formal (base category) on reinvestment likelihood. (6) In column 6, we estimate the model shown in column 4 by
using nearest neighbor matching estimator. 3 closest neighbors are used in the estimations. The biases regarding the continuous variables
are corrected by bias adjustment procedure. p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01
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Table 5: Test for the stability of estimates for Save with household members
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Save with household members -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.12***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Borrowed 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Education -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female -0.08** -0.09*** -0.07**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Single 0.04 0.04 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
No training -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.07**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Income 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 877 877 877 877 877 877
Pseudo R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.22
Sector FE No No No No Yes Yes
Region FE No No No No No Yes
Notes: In this table, we test the stability of our estimates for Save with household members shown in column 4 of Table 3 by inserting key
control variable desperately. Reinvestment is the dependent variable in the estimations. We estimate Probit models for all specifications
in columns 1 to 5 and report marginal effects estimates at mean values for all variables and robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. The definitions of the variables are given in Table 1. The details of the estimations in the columns 1 to
5 are as follows: (1) In column 1, we estimate the model withut a control variable. (2) In column 2, we control for access to finance by
using our borrowing proxy (Borrowed). (3) In column 3, we control for productivity proxies, education, training, and income in addition
to borrowing (4) In column 4, we additionally insert Female and Single variable to control for gender and being married. (5) In column
5, we control for sectoral heterogeneity by using sector dummies in addition previous control variables. (6) In column 6, we finally insert
region dummies to control for regional heterogeneity. p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01
41
Table 6: Estimates for reinvestment and save with household members relationship-additional control
variables
(1) (2)








Initial capital stock 0.02**
(0.01)









Entrepreneurial dummies Yes No
Activity Dummy Yes No
Region FE Yes No
District FE No Yes
Notes: This table test the robustness of the estimates for Save informal with household members shown in Column 4 of Table 3 to the
inclusion of additional control variables. Reinvestment is the dependent variable in the estimations. We estimate Probit models for the
in columns 1 and 2 and report marginal effects estimates at mean values for all variables and robust standard errors in parentheses.
In addition to the variables shown in the Table, we also add Borrowed, Education, Female, Single, No training, Income, and region
dummies to the estimated models as control variables. The detailed definitions of these variables are given in Table 1. The sample used
for estimations include only formal savers and informal savers with household members. Save formal is the base category for Save with
household member estimates in both estimations. The details of the estimations in the columns 1 and 2 are as follows: (1) In column 1,
we test whether the estimate for Save informal with household members is robust with respect to the inclusion of a vector of additional
variables in addition to the listed variables above and region dummies. These additional control variables are as follows. Formal loan,
Semi-formal loan, and Informal loan are dummy variables equals to 1 if the respondent received credit from formal, semi-formal and
informal resources. Initial capital stock is the logarithm of the value of capital in U.S dollars invested to establish the business. Sales per
worker is the sales divided by number of permanent workers of the business the respondent owns in logarithms. Rural is a dummy variable
equals to 1 if entrepreneur lives at a rural area. Size is the number of permanent employees working in the business of the entrepreneur in
logarithms. Duration is the logarithm of the number of years that the entrepreneur is doing the business. Entrepreneurial dummies consist
of seven binary variables created for the listed answers to the question why did you go into business?. The list comprises statements I
was fired / lost/retrenched from a previous job; I couldn’t find a job elsewhere; To support me / my family; To try out a business idea; I
believe I can make more money working for myself than for someone else; I had nothing else to do/no other means of survival/no better
option; parents /relatives were in business; I saw a good opportunity; I have always wanted my own business; I was encouraged by friends
and relatives; and I needed to supplement my income as an answer. Activity dummies consist of 5 dummy variables indicating whether
the business owned by the respondent buy and sell goods; buy, add value and sell goods; make and sell goods; provide services; or do
other activities including agricultural ones. (2) In column 2, we test whether the estimate for Save informal with household members
is robust with respect to replacing region dummies with district dummies. Since there is no reinvestment variation at some district the
number of observations is lower for this estimation. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01
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Table 7: The estimates for save with household members vs. formal saving choices
(1) (2)
Bank branch withing -0.13***
one hour walking distance (0.04)
Min. distance to 0.04***


















Notes: This table shows the estimates for the determinants of the choice Save informal with household members vs. Save formal. Save
informal with household members is the dependent variable, and Save formal is the base category for Save with household member
estimates. The definitions for the variables are given in Table 1. We report marginal effects estimates at mean values for all estimations
from Probit estimations and robust standard errors are in parentheses. The sample used for estimations include only formal savers and
informal savers with household members. We additionally control for region fixed effects by adding region dummies to the estimations.
The details of the estimations in column 1 and 2 are as follows: (1) In column 1, we use Bank branch within one hour walking distance as
our distance formal banking services measure. (2) In column 2, we use Minimum distance to ATM, bank branch, or MFI as our distance
formal banking services measure. p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01
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Table 8: Tests for exogeneity of instruments and Bivariate Probit Estimates for save with household
member
Exogeneity checks Bivariate Probit Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Save with household members -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.20** -0.20**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10)
Bank branch within one hour 0.00
walking distance (0.03)
Min. distance to ATM, bank -0.01







Observations 877 797 877 797
Exogenous distance measure - - Bank branch Min. distance
within one hour to ATM, bank
walking distance branch, or MFI
Methodology Probit Probit Bivariate Probit Bivariate Probit
Notes:This table shows the bivariate probit estimates for Save informal with household members and summarize our informal exogeneity
test for the excluded instruments. Reinvestment is the dependent variable for the estimates, and Save formal is the base category for
Save with household member estimates. The sample used for estimations include only formal savers and informal savers with household
members. We report marginal effect estimates of Save with household members at mean values, robust standard errors in the parentheses
at columns 1 and 3, and clustered robust standard errors at ward level in the parentheses in columns 2-4. We also control for Borrowed,
Education, Female, Single, No training, Income, and region dummies in all models. The detailed variable definitions are given in Table
1. The details of the estimations shown in Column 1 to 4 are as follows: (1) In column 1, we informally test whether our instruments,
Bank branch within one hour walking distance, Age, and Age2 do not have a direct impact on reinvestment likelihood in order to test
the exogeneity of the instruments that will be used in Column 3 of the Table. If the estimates are not statistically significant than
it may imply that they do not have direct impact on reinvestment but have an impact only through saving practice choice. Marginal
effect estimates at mean values from Probit estimations and robust standard errors in the parenthesis are reported. (2) In column 2, we
informally test whether our instruments, Minimum distance to ATM, bank branch, or MFI, Age, and Age2 do not have a direct impact
on reinvestment likelihood in order to test the exogeneity of the instruments that will be used in Column 4 of the Table. If the estimates
are not statistically significant than it may imply that they do not have direct impact on reinvestment but have an impact only through
saving practice choice. Marginal effect estimates at mean values from Probit estimations and robust standard errors in the parenthesis
are reported. (3) In column 3, we report the marginal effect estimates for Save informal with household members from Bivariate Probit
estimation. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Our excluded instruments for saving practice choice between Save with household
members and Save formal are Bank branch within one hour walking distance, Age, and Age2 .µ is the correlation estimate for the error
terms from model 15 and 16. (4) In column 4, we report the marginal effect estimates for Save informal with household members from
Bivariate Probit estimation. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Our excluded instruments for saving practice choice between Save
with household members and Save formal are Minimum distance to ATM, bank branch, or MFI, Age, and Age2. µ is the correlation
estimate for the error terms from model 15 and 16. p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01
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Table 9: Heterogeneity in the effect of saving with household members on reinvestment
Gender Position in the household
Male Female Other (Child, Head
spouse, sibling etc)
Save with -0.12** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.16***
household members (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06)
Observations 402 275 213 441
Notes: This table summarizes the heterogeneity in the estimates for Save informal with household members for the benchmark estimate
shown in column 4 of Table 3. To test the heterogeneity, we estimate the models in specific subsamples determined acccording to the
respondent characteristics (please see below). Reinvestment is the dependent variable in the estimations, and Save formal is the base
category for Save informal with household member estimates. The sample used for estimations include only formal savers and informal
savers with household members. We report marginal effect estimates of the estimates at mean values from Probit estimations and robust
standard errors in the parentheses. We also control for Borrowed, Education, Female, Single, No training, Income, sector and region
dummies in all models. The detailed variable definition are given in Table 1. Since there is no reinvestment variation at some subsamples,
the number of observations are lower for this estimation, and we therefore estimate all models for the same subsamples where there is
variation in our reinvestment variables. The details of the estimations shown in Gender and Position in the household columns are as
follows: (1) In Gender column, we estimate the model for the male and female respondents separately. (2) In Position in the household
column, we separately estimate the model for the respondents who are household heads and others (not households such as child, spouse,




Table A1: Estimates for reinvestment and saving/saving practices relationship by using full sample
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES reinvest reinvest reinvest




Save informal individually 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01)
Save informal with others 0.01
(0.02)
Save with household members -0.01
(0.02)
Save with people outside household 0.04
(0.03)
Borrowed 0.04** 0.04** 0.04**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female -0.03** -0.03** -0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Single 0.04** 0.04** 0.04**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
No training -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Income 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 5,803 5,803 5,803
Sample All All All
Hypothesis p-values p-values p-values
H0: Save formal-Save informal=0 0.0723 - -
H0: Save formal-Save informal individually=0 - 0.1819 0.1763
H0: Save formal-Save informal with others=0 - 0.0011 -
H0: Save formal-Save with household members=0 - - 0.0004
H0: Save formal-Save with people outside household=0 - - 0.0662
Notes: This table shows the baseline estimation results for the relationship between saving practices, control variables and reinvestment
likelihood by using the full sample for each estimation presented in columns 1 to 3. The detailed variable definitions are given in Table
1. Reinvestment is the dependent variable in the estimations. We estimate Probit models for all specifications and report marginal
effects estimates at mean values for all variables and robust standard errors in parentheses. To control for unobserved regional and sector
level fixed effects, we add sector and and region dummies to all estimations. The details of the estimations in the columns 1 to 3 are
as follows: (1) In column 1, we compare the reinvestment likelihood of formal and informal savers with non-savers. The estimate for
Save formal (informal) shows the difference between the impact of Save formal (informal) and not saving (base category) on reinvestment
likelihood. (2) In column 2, we disentangle informal saving practices to saving informal individually and saving informal with others by
adding separate dummies for each group. The estimate for Save informal individually (Save informal with others) shows the difference
between the impact of Save informal individually (Save informal with others) and Not saving (base category) on reinvestment likelihood.
(3) In column 3, we disentangle save informal with other to save informal with household members and save informal with people outside.
The estimate for Save informal with household member (people outside) shows the difference between the impact of Save informal with
household members (people outside) and Not saving (base category) on reinvestment likelihood. (4) We test the difference of the impacts
of difference saving practices from Save formal at the bottom of the Table. H0 indicates the null hypothesis of the test. p-values for the
t-test are given in corresponding rows and columns. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01
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Table A2: Bivariate Probit Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependendent variable: Reinvestment Save with Reinvestment Save with
household members household members
Save with household members -0.81** -0.86**
(0.37) (0.41)
Bank branch withing -0.39***
one hour walking distance (0.12)
Min. distance to 0.10***





Borrowed 0.07 -0.98*** 0.05 -0.97***
(0.16) (0.12) (0.17) (0.13)
Education -0.07 -0.33*** -0.07 -0.34***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Female -0.24** -0.27** -0.31*** -0.28**
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Single 0.25 -0.47** 0.25 -0.44*
(0.18) (0.22) (0.20) (0.24)
No training -0.32*** 0.05 -0.36*** 0.04
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12)
Income 0.08 -0.28*** 0.06 -0.27***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Constant 0.05 8.51*** 0.56 8.08***
(1.07) (0.97) (1.23) (1.08)
Observations 877 877 797 797
Notes: This table shows the detailed bivariate probit coefficient estimates for the columns 3 and 4 of Table 5. We report bivariate probit
estimates for all estimations. Robust standard errors for columns 1 and 3 and clustered robust standard errors at ward level in columns
2-4 are in parentheses. We use the sample for Formal Savers and Household Savers in all estimations, and Save formal is the base category
for Save informal with household members. We additionally control for region dummies in the estimations. The details of columns 1 to 4
are as follows: (1) In column 1, we present the bivariate probit estimates of model (15) which is jointly estimated with model (16) using
Bank branch within one hour walking distance as the distance measure. (2) In column 2, we present the bivariate probit estimates of
model (16) using Bank branch within one hour walking distance as the distance measure and jointly estimated with model (15). (3) In
column 3, we present the bivariate probit estimates of model (15) which is jointly estimated with model (16) using Minimum distance to
ATM, bank branch, or MFI as the distance measure. (4) In column 2, we present the bivariate probit estimates of model (16) using using
Minimum distance to ATM, bank branch, or MFI as the distance measure and jointly estimated with model (15). p<0.1. ** p<0.05. ***
p<0.01
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